Beniah Naylor
SAWHORSE
What document or rule requires classroom to have exterior windows? Is it a federal thing? State thing? Where does that come from?
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E occupancy egress code changes.
- Thread starter Beniah Naylor
- Start date
brokenkeys
Member
State Requirements for Educational Facilities (SREF). Applies to all Florida public schools. Not applicable to private and charter schools (take a guess who has better lobbyists).
Spatial requirements come from FDOE reviews during the design process, hence some leeway via variances, but the other stuff is required and incorporated in Ch 4 of the Florida Building Code:
Not previously mentioned but similar to your proposals:
Spatial requirements come from FDOE reviews during the design process, hence some leeway via variances, but the other stuff is required and incorporated in Ch 4 of the Florida Building Code:
453.7.9 Exit passageways and horizontal exits.
Exit passageways as referenced in Section 1024 and horizontal exits referenced in Section 1026 of this code shall be prohibited.453.13.8.1Natural light and ventilation.
Natural light and ventilation requirements for new construction shall be satisfied by windows with operable glazing, providing a net free open area equivalent to 5 percent of the floor area, in all classrooms on the perimeter of buildings, where required by Chapter 1013, Florida Statutes. Auxiliary spaces, music rooms, gyms, locker and shower facilities, laboratories requiring special climate control, and large group instructional spaces having a capacity of more than 100 persons need not have operable windows for the purpose of providing natural light and ventilation. Emergency access, emergency rescue, and secondary means of egress windows maybe included in the calculation to comply with this requirement.Not previously mentioned but similar to your proposals:
453.7.1Separate exits.
In assembly occupancies, each required exit from an assembly space must exit into a separate atmosphere or to the exterior, to be considered as a separate exit.453.13.1Doors.
All spaces with an occupant load of six or more students, regardless of use, shall have a door opening directly to the exterior, or as required in the Florida Fire Prevention Code as adopted by the State Fire Marshal, in buildings of three stories or less shall have a rescue window opening directly to the exterior, or shall be fully sprinklered. All doors and gates from spaces with an occupant load of six or more students, regardless of use or location, shall swing in the direction of exit travel, shall be of the side-hinged type, and shall always be operable from the inside by a single operation and without a key. [Not part of FBC but there is an administrative code buried somewhere in State Statute that says something similar to this but with less exceptions.]
steveray
SAWHORSE
We already have that...
1007.1.1 Two exits or exit access doorways. Where two
exits, exit access doorways, exit access stairways or
ramps, or any combination thereof, are required from any
portion of the exit access, they shall be placed a distance
apart equal to not less than one-half of the length of the
maximum overall diagonal dimension of the building or
area to be served measured in a straight line between them.
Interlocking or scissor stairways shall be counted as one
exit stairway.
Beniah Naylor
SAWHORSE
Not quite. The code section you quoted allows to exit access doorways into the same corridor if the doors are far enough apart.
The changes I put into the potential code section say that the exit and the exit access have to be independent from each other all the way out of the building.
steveray
SAWHORSE
The whole point of remoteness is to reduce the likelyhood that both get blocked....
Mr. Inspector
SAWHORSE
Seems to me a good fence around the school with cameras and a guard at the gate would eliminate any problems with doors, exits And windows.
Beniah Naylor
SAWHORSE
I want to make it clear that I am completely in favor of increasing security with methods other than egress.
I just think it's basically a pipe dream. Any passive system to deny entry that you can propose is not that difficult to defeat if you have time to plan - and an aggressor has as much time to plan as they want. To make passive systems work, someone motivated and vigilant has to be managing all of the passive systems and able to respond to keep them from failing or when they fail to contain the threat by themselves. Someone like this is not cheap, and it will probably take more than one. You have to pay them thousands of dollars a year... every year... forever... It's not just a one-time deal like passive systems.
A fence? Sure, but someone motivated and vigilant has to be watching it, or someone will cut through, ram through, dig under, use a ladder, etc.
Single entry? Sure, but any normal door can be breached relatively quickly with the right tools - I can think of a dozen ways breach a sturdy door, people who open the door can be ambushed (somebody has to take the trash out eventually...), or people are careless and leave it open. And then, a single entry door can be blocked to stop emergency responders. Single entry is a great tactic - but someone has to be actively watching and defending for that to work.
Metal detectors? Security cameras? Guard dogs? A central command center to monitor the school and isolate the threat? Yes, yes, yes, and yes, but someone motivated has to be there to make them work.
How much does a good security team cost annually? Because one stereotypical rent-a-cop won't cut it. And then, when you have a security team, they will be called upon to deal with troublesome students, and subsequently sacrificed to appease irate parents. Our culture will not be willing to pay for the kind of people who would take the job seriously, would not support them when they do their jobs, and a school is not a place that our culture will accept the kind of rigid security you could get away with at a normal "secure facility". Security and convenience have an inverse relationship, and our culture is all about convenience.
Is the building code a place to address any of the above? Should it be? I want all of the security listed above to be implemented, but I don't think it ever will be implemented effectively.
The building code already deals with egress, which is why I got started on this line of thought. In my opinion, multiple egress paths is the only passive system that the victims can utilize to save their life whether help is on the way or not. It is also the only place I am aware of that the building code intersects with school security already. If there are other places that I am overlooking, please comment. I would be interesting in making those code changes as well.
I just think it's basically a pipe dream. Any passive system to deny entry that you can propose is not that difficult to defeat if you have time to plan - and an aggressor has as much time to plan as they want. To make passive systems work, someone motivated and vigilant has to be managing all of the passive systems and able to respond to keep them from failing or when they fail to contain the threat by themselves. Someone like this is not cheap, and it will probably take more than one. You have to pay them thousands of dollars a year... every year... forever... It's not just a one-time deal like passive systems.
A fence? Sure, but someone motivated and vigilant has to be watching it, or someone will cut through, ram through, dig under, use a ladder, etc.
Single entry? Sure, but any normal door can be breached relatively quickly with the right tools - I can think of a dozen ways breach a sturdy door, people who open the door can be ambushed (somebody has to take the trash out eventually...), or people are careless and leave it open. And then, a single entry door can be blocked to stop emergency responders. Single entry is a great tactic - but someone has to be actively watching and defending for that to work.
Metal detectors? Security cameras? Guard dogs? A central command center to monitor the school and isolate the threat? Yes, yes, yes, and yes, but someone motivated has to be there to make them work.
How much does a good security team cost annually? Because one stereotypical rent-a-cop won't cut it. And then, when you have a security team, they will be called upon to deal with troublesome students, and subsequently sacrificed to appease irate parents. Our culture will not be willing to pay for the kind of people who would take the job seriously, would not support them when they do their jobs, and a school is not a place that our culture will accept the kind of rigid security you could get away with at a normal "secure facility". Security and convenience have an inverse relationship, and our culture is all about convenience.
Is the building code a place to address any of the above? Should it be? I want all of the security listed above to be implemented, but I don't think it ever will be implemented effectively.
The building code already deals with egress, which is why I got started on this line of thought. In my opinion, multiple egress paths is the only passive system that the victims can utilize to save their life whether help is on the way or not. It is also the only place I am aware of that the building code intersects with school security already. If there are other places that I am overlooking, please comment. I would be interesting in making those code changes as well.
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CR Design
SAWHORSE
I believe it is unlikely that a code revision alone will adequately provide a panacea for the challenges of active shooters in schools. I agree that the proposed IBC s.1006.2.2.7 might offer a partial solution by offering a second option. I also think we can be smart by understanding that the concern of egress through intervening spaces would not be an issue for this redundant egress alternative. In a fire event, the corridor egress path would be the primary. The secondary exit access to an adjacent classroom would only be used in the active shooter scenario. The door swing issue would still need to be addressed.
TeacherLock
Registered User
I would like to commend the code officials on this thread for thinking out of the box when it comes to school safety. If I may lend some industry experience to the conversation, there are some very important points to consider. I am the founder of TeacherLock, the gold standard in classroom lockdown devices. The first line of defense is to run, so having multiple paths of egress is very valuable. My wife is a teacher, she has a plan for this and is fortunate to have multiple exits. But, each one of those exits must be capable of lockdown. We have a very large customer in Kansas who added TeacherLock devices to each door leading to the hallway and also adjoining classroom doors (one on each side). We can debate the merits of the NFPA101 Life Safety Guidance which allows for two operations to unlock/unlatch a door during a lockdown emergency. We have run the numbers and a person's chance of being injured in a fire during lockdown are less than the same person getting hit by lightening six times in the same year. But, if a single operation to unlock/unlatch is needed, we have that solution as well. Post incident reports show that when an active shooter encounters a locked door, they move on. These precious seconds allow law enforcement the time they need. From a tactical point of view, centralized locking systems are dangerous and can create a funnel of death in the hallway. Tactical control of the door for cover and concealment is the key to survival in these instances. I would encourage an alignment in the IBC to reflect what the NFPA already knows: two operations to unlatch/unlock as long as it is ADA compliant and the device is only lockable by an authorized person makes perfect sense. We want building officials to understand how active shooter emergencies work in real life. Video systems and mag locks are not going to do the job when the SHTF. www.teacherlock.com